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21 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SALT Support Staff
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Preparations for SALT Testimony ☐

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1. After the last two MEET THE PRESS sessions, a few things occur to me that we should keep in mind or for which we should develop specific responses:

a. Secretary Vance stated that we have "over 500 planes based in Europe that can reach the Soviet Union." Is that correct? Should we have a list of the forces capable of delivering nuclear weapons on the United States, e.g., BACKFIRE on a one-way mission, and on the Soviet Union?

b. Secretary Brown talked about chemical warfare arms limitations. I am not too familiar with this, but I thought we had a ban on the use of chemical warfare and no limitations. In short, I have been under the impression that the Naval Disarmament Treaties of the 1920s are the only examples of disarmament prior to SALT I. ☐

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
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


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3. I think we ought to be prepared to state what we think the Soviet reaction would be if the Treaty were amended and sent back to negotiations. It is not our position to take a stand on whether it should be amended but we can legitimately be asked how the Soviets might react. ☐

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5. We also need to continue working with the charts Howie developed on increments to lethal area potential and hard target potential. One of the big factors is going to be what changes the strategic balance. With either those charts or EMT and RV charts, we need to be able to put into perspective what a Soviet increment would do and how it would change the relative positions of red and blue lines on those charts. Without something concrete like this, arguments can go on forever as to whether specific cheating scenarios will lead to a strategic advantage or not. ☐

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6. A great deal was made by the anti-SALT people on MEET THE PRESS on the number of warheads the Soviets will have and can have under SALT II. I think we ought to have a chart ready on this one which shows what we expect they would have and what is the maximum they could have if they abided by the Treaty. We should do this for every several years between now and the end of the Treaty. ☐


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7. We also need a very thorough statement on the question of excess missiles (the old missiles, that is). ☐

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STANSFIELD TURNER


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